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I. INTRODUCTION
Solar power's once bright future as a utility-scale' power source
may be in jeopardy. 2 Just as the industry began to overcome the deep-
rooted hurdles of high equipment costs and low efficiency, it now faces
another challenge: debt financing. In September 2011, the federal loan
guarantee program available to renewable energy generation projects
utilizing commercially-proven technologies (1705 Program)4 expired,
ending a crucial incentive for banks to lend to solar projects, and in all
1. See Chris Schandera, Siemens Fin. Servs., Presentation on Developing Bankable
Solar PV Projects - Key Success Factors (June 16, 2011), available at
http://www.industry.usa.siemens.com/topics/us/en/solarexchange/west/Documents/SolarExc
hange-Deveolpingbankablesolarpvprojects20110615.pdf (defining "utility scale" solar
projects as those that range from a few megawatts to a few hundred megawatts); Valerie
Rauluk, Venture Catalyst Inc., Presentation on Utility Scale Solar Power Opportunities and
Obstacles (Mar. 17, 2008), available at http://giffords.house.gov/PowerpointRauluk.ppt
(defining "[u]ility scale solar energy" as "[a]ny project/program offering high volume,
lower-cost, reliable, and dependable solar energy for 20 years plus at fixed prices for large
numbers of customers") (presenting to U.S. H.R. Comm. on Science and Tech., Subcomm.
on Energy and Env't.).
2. See generally Galen Barbose et al., Tracking the Sun IV, LAWRENCE BERKELEY
NAT'L LAB. 2 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter Tracking], available at
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-5047e.pdf (summarizing cost trends in photovoltaic
solar power systems from 1998 through 2011).
3. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Here Comes the Sun, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at
A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/opinion/krugman-here-comes-solar-
energy.htmi (arguing that solar panel manufacturer Solyndra's failure is actually the result
of technological progress in the solar industry and that solar power is on the brink of
becoming cost competitive with other forms of energy generation). See infra Part V.C., for
a discussion of Solyndra's bankruptcy.
4. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 1705, 42 U.S.C. § 16516
(Supp. IV 2010) ("The authority to enter into guarantees under this section shall expire on
September 30, 2011."). Section 1703 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which does not
have a sunset date, still allows for DOE to make loan guarantees but only to renewable
energy generation projects that "employ new or significantly improved technologies as
compared to commercial technologies." 42 U.S.C. § 16513 (2006).
5. This Note focuses on solar power; however, the same or similar challenges apply to
wind, geothermal, and a host of other renewable energy generation sources. See generally
EDISON ELEC. INST., RENEWABLE ENERGY: GROWTH AND CHALLENGES IN THE ELECTRIC
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likelihood stalling "one of the financial engines powering" clean energy
investments across the United States.6
The 1705 Program was a keystone piece in the solar energy
puzzle. From July 2009 through September 2011, the Department of
Energy (DOE), acting under the authority of section 1705 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct),7 guaranteed approximately $12 billion in
loans to twelve utility-scale solar power generation projects.8 While the
1705 Program was originally intended as a "temporary program" to
address the economic downturn beginning in 2008,9 it proved to be a
catalyst for solar power generation.10 With the expiration of this critical
lending incentive, equity investors, project developers, and technology
providers are hesitant to finance solar energy projects in full.
The bankruptcy of solar power component manufacturer
Solyndra LLC, a loan guarantee recipient under the now-expired 1705
Program, brought to light a simple, yet serious flaw in the previous
program: the federal government provided loan guarantees to both
manufacturing facilities and power generation facilities without
accommodating for the different risk profiles of the two types of
projects." A new federal loan guarantee program restricted to energy
generation facilities powered by commercially-mature renewable energy
technology addresses this exact concern. Such a program will mitigate
technological, operational, and financial risk, while still meeting the
POWER INDUSTRY (2008), http://www.eei.org/ourissues/ElectricityGeneration/Documents/
RenewEngy broch.pdf (providing an overview of the technology behind, and challenges
faced by, the predominant renewable energy generation resources).
6. Matthew Lynley, Plunging Solar Panel Prices Claim First Victim: Solyndra Files
for Bankruptcy, GREENBEAT (Sept. 1, 2011), http://venturebeat.com/2011/09/01/solyndra-
bankruptcy-solar-costs/.
7. See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1705, 42 U.S.C. § 16516 (Supp. IV 2010).
8. See PHILLIP BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42059, SOLAR PROJECTS: DOE
SECTION 1705 LOAN GUARANTEES 1 (2011).
9. 1705, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE,
https://lpo.energy.gov/?page id=41 (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) ("Section 1705 is a
temporary program designed to address the current economic conditions of the nation. It
authorizes loan guarantees for certain renewable energy systems, electric power
transmission systems and leading edge biofuels projects that commence construction no
later than September 30, 2011.").
10. See infra Part V.B.
11. See BROWN, supra note 8, at 7-8 ("Section 1705 solar projects fall into one of two
categories: (1) solar manufacturing, or (2) solar generation. Risk characteristics for each
category are distinctly different and solar manufacturing projects are generally considered
higher risk than solar generation projects because the latter can use contractual mechanisms
to reduce market, project, and financial risks.").
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goals of increased renewable energy, job creation, and domestic
technology growth. 12
Following this introduction, Part II of this Note will outline the
solar industry's significant progress over the last half decade. 13 Part II
discusses the current federal government's renewable energy policy,
which uses tax credits, depreciation and, until recently, loan guarantees
to incentivize project development.14  Next, Part IV highlights
innovative financing structures that enable investors in utility-scale
solar projects to capture these federal incentives.15 Part V reviews the
successes, and notable failure, of the expired 1705 Program.' Finally,
Part VI lays out why a new, more narrowly tailored loan guarantee
program limited to power generation projects will reduce the overall
risk to taxpayers while still promoting the use and adoption of utility-
scale solar power.' 7
1I. GLOBAL GROWTH IN THE UTILITY-SCALE SOLAR MARKET
"The tipping point where renewables become the predominant
energy option now appears closer than it did just a few years back."' 8
In places like Hawaii, with high electricity rates and abundant sun,
photovoltaic-generated (PV)' 9 solar energy is already cheaper than
buying electricity from the grid.20  The cost per watt for energy
12. See id. at 8.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. ANGUS MCCORONE ET AL., UNITED NATIONS ENv'T PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG
ENERGY FIN., GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2011 27 (2011),
available at
www.unep.org/pdf/BNEFglobal-trendsinrenewableenergy investment 2011 report.pd
f (arguing that investment incentives and other government policies deserve much of the
credit for technological progress in renewable energy).
19. A typical photovoltaic panel contains a silicon wafer that is treated to form
differently charged n-type and p-type silicon, which together create an electric circuit;
sunlight activates the solar cell's circuit to create electricity and manufacturers typically
connect multiple solar cells to construct a solar module. See Julie Burlage, Financial
Viability of a 2MW Solar Photovoltaic Installation in the Industrial Sector of New Jersey
(Aug. 28, 2009) (unpublished Master's thesis, Nicholas Sch. of the Env't and Earth Sci.) (on
file with Duke Univ. Librs.), available at
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/1372?show=ful.
20. See Ben Sills, Solar Panels Start to Outshine Mirrors, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
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generated by utility-scale PV systems fell by twenty-six percent in 2010
and an additional twelve percent in the first six months of 201 1.21 The
price for PV modules, which comprise approximately half to two-thirds
of a utility-scale solar project's cost, dropped fifty-eight percent from
2008 to 2011.22
The recent drop in PV project costs makes it the current top
choice among solar power technologies.23 In August 2011, Solar Trust
of America, the American subsidiary of German solar energy
conglomerate Solar Millennium AG, switched the technology on the
world's largest solar generating facility currently under development
from concentrating solar power24 (CSP) to PV.25 Driving the rapid cost
reduction in PV technology is China.2 6
The United States is a historically weak player in the solar
industry; as of 2010, Germany, Spain, Japan, and Italy all led the U.S. in
total installed PV capacity.27 Despite President Obama's apparent
enthusiasm for "green energy," Chinese companies' investment in
Oct. 13, 2011, at 65 [hereinafter Sills, Solar Panels] (arguing additionally that while solar
thermal may not ever be able to compete with PV on pure cost, its ability to store power by
heating vats of liquid salt may keep it relevant; the International Energy Agency predicts
more than one hundred fold increase in solar thermal capacity by 2020, even in light of the
recent PV price drop).
21. Tracking, supra note 2, at 2.
22. See Press Release, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Solar Energy Hardware Prices
Plunge (June 17, 2011), http://bnef.com/Downloads/pressreleases/155/pdffile; Tracking,
supra note 2, at 2 (presenting research data from the first half of 2011 that indicates PV
price declines of more than ten percent).
23. Concentrated Solar Gets a Boost from US, EURACTIV.COM (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-solarpower/concentrated-solar-gets-boost-us-news-
508619 (explaining that steep price declines in PV technology, caused by oversupply and
the global recession, have increased competitiveness of solar photovoltaic energy relative to
competing solar technologies).
24. See Concentrating Solar Power, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (July 11, 2011),
http://www.nrel.gov/learning/re csp.html (explaining that concentrating solar uses hundreds
or thousands of U-shaped mirrors to redirect and focus sunlight on fluid filled tubes, and the
hot fluid is in turn used to boil water, turning a turbine generator to produce electricity).
25. Michael Kanellos, Dark Day for Solar Thermal: Solar Trust Switches 500MW
Power Plant to PV, GREENTECHSOLAR (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/dark-day-for-solar-thermal-solar-trust-
switches-500-mw-power-plant-to-pv/.
26. See Bill Savadove, China takes over as US solar power firms fail, PHYSORG.coM
(Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-09-china-solar-power-firms.html.
27. JANET SAWIN ET AL., RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, RENEWABLES 2011 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 72 (2011), available at
http://www.ren21.net/Portals/97/documents/GSR/REN21_GSR2011.pdf.
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American projects may outpace that of our own government. 28 In 2011,
a single Chinese company and its American subsidiary announced plans
to invest more than $6 billion in U.S. clean energy through 2020.29 By
comparison, the 111th Congress appropriated just $4 billion to support
clean energy through loan guarantees over three years.30  Foreign
investors' desire to invest equity in U.S.-based renewable energy
projects illustrates the benefit our Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
provides to equity investors that own projects, as compared to debt
investors that simply earn a return on their loaned capital. 31  The
absence of a mature debt market for large-scale solar projects has led to
relatively high costs for project debt, despite significant drops in the
price of PV panels, labor, and the other project costs.32
China attracted more new investment in renewable energy than
any other nation in both 2009 and 2010, and over one-third of the
world's total was directed to Chinese projects in 2010 alone. In terms
of debt, the Chinese government has extended approximately $35
billion in credit to solar-energy companies since 2010.34 China
Development Bank Corp., the world's largest lender to solar companies,
offered $29 billion in credit to five Chinese PV panel manufacturers.35
As of November 2011, the group had tapped just $866 million, or less
than three percent of available funds.36 Tens of billions of dollars
28. See Ben Sills, China Buries Obama's 'Sputnik' Goal for Clean-Energy Use,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:36 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-04-
04/china-buries-obama-s-sputnik-goal-for-clean-energy-use.html [hereinafter Sills, China].
29. Chinese Energy Group Plans $8 Billion in US Clean Energy Investments,
SUSTAINABLEBUSINESSNEWS.COM (Sept. 6, 2011, 9:11 AM),
http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/22866.
30. See Jack Caldwell & Richard W. Caperton, End the Raids on Clean Energy
Funding, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 11, 2010),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/08/clean energy raids.html; David Rogers,
State Aid Bill to Bring House Back, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/40636_Page2.html.
31. See Roberta F. Mann, Federal, State, and Local Tax Policies for Climate Change:
Coordination or Cross-Purpose?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 369, 379 (2011) ("The federal
government provides greater subsidies to the energy sector through the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) than by any other means.").
32. See Tracking, supra note 2, at 2.
33. See MCCORONE, supra note 18, at 19.
34. See Sills, China, supra note 28.
35. See Sally Bakewell, Chinese Renewable Energy Companies Slow to Tap $47
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remain available to Chinese PV panel manufacturers to support the
research, development, and manufacture of more efficient solar power
components - continuing to push solar power toward grid parity with
other power generation sources.
III. U.S. INCENTIVES REWARD EQUITY INVESTMENT
U.S. solar companies and project developers rely on two types
of federal incentives: tax credits and depreciation deductions. Both
reward equity investment. The 1705 Program complemented these
equity incentives by guaranteeing loans to qualified solar projects, but
its expiration means a key component of the renewable energy project
finance equation is missing.
A. Incentives for Equity Investment
The IRC provides three primary tax benefits for the equity
investor in a renewable energy project: (1) the Production Tax Credit
(PTC),37 (2) the Investment Tax Credit (ITC),38 each available exclusive
of the other, and (3) accelerated depreciation. 39 The PTC provides an
income tax credit that varies according to the amount of energy
produced from "qualified sources" during a ten-year period.4 0  Wind
power facilities are the primary recipient among the "qualified sources"
eligible for the PTC, which also includes closed- and open-loop biomass
and geothermal, among others.41 Solar power projects' eligibility for
the PTC expired in 2005; thus, new solar developers wishing to take
advantage of federal incentives are relegated to the ITC.4 2 In addition, a
non-operating owner of a renewable energy generation facility may not
claim the PTC, thereby requiring a project finance structure that allows
the passive equity investors to meet operating requirements.4 3
37. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV 2010).
38. § 48.
39. 26 U.S.C. § 168(k) (2006).
40. See 26 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV 2010).
41. Jerome L. Garciano, Green Energy Tax Policies: State and Federal Tax Incentives
for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, 25-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 12, 12
(2011).
42. § 45(d)(4).
43. § 45(d)(3)(C) ("[T]he person eligible for the credit allowable under subsection (a)
shall be the lessee or the operator of such facility.")
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The ITC, the primary federal incentive for solar power
development, provides an income tax credit equal to a specified
percentage of the "energy property" placed in service during the taxable
year." Currently, the ITC is thirty percent for qualified solar facilities,
fuel cells, and small wind (under 100 kilowatts), and ten percent for
other qualifying "energy property." 5 In order to take the credit, the
taxpayer must either construct the solar facility or acquire ownership at
the time operation commences. 46  Equity investment in utility-scale
solar facilities benefits from the thirty percent credit through January 1,
2017, at which point solar projects will only be eligible for a ten percent
credit.47
In addition to the PTC and ITC, the federal government allows
the recovery of equity investment in certain types of property, including
solar power facilities, through depreciation deductions to taxable
income.48 The Accelerated Cost Recovery System provides a five-year
depreciation schedule for solar facilities qualifying for the ITC.49 Thus,
the owner of a solar energy facility that qualifies for the ITC may write
off approximately one-fifth the asset value during each of the facility's
first five years.50 The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 201051 amended the existing
44. § 48(a). For "equipment which uses solar energy to generate electricity," the thirty
percent credit may be utilized if the construction or acquisition occurs prior to Jan. 1, 2017.
Id.
45. Id. For example, a coal plant is eligible for a ten percent tax credit under the ITC.
Id.
46. § 48(a)(3)(B); see also Memorandum from Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP,
Investment in Alternative Energy After the End of Cash Grants, to Clients & Friends 12
(Sept. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Investment in Alternative Energy], available at
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client-friend/0906 11 InvestmentAlternativeEnergy.pdf
(explaining that the ITC is not available to a secondary purchaser of property that is already
producing energy).
47. § 48(a)(2).
48. § 168(k) (listing depreciation deductions according to property type; not specific to
the renewable energy industry).
49. § 168(e)(3)(B)(vi).
50. The five-year schedule for most types of solar, geothermal, and wind property has
been in place since 1986. Federal: Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency,
DSIRE,
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?IncentiveCode=USO6F&re=1&ee=1
(last updated Oct. 14, 2011) [hereinafter DSIRE].
51. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010 § 401, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296, 3304 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §
168 (Supp. IV 2010)).
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federal depreciation provisions for solar facilities, providing that
qualified property placed in service after September 8, 2010 and before
January 1, 2012 qualifies for one-hundred percent bonus depreciation.52
As tax-related benefits, the PTC, ITC, and depreciation
deduction all require a tax burden against which each benefit may be
applied.5 3 Thus, the widespread drop in taxable corporate profits in
2008 posed a significant problem for renewable energy project
development. In response to this very issue, Congress included two
provisions that sustain investment in the domestic solar power industry
in two broader omnibus bills. First, the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act, which President Bush signed into law on October 3,
2008, extended the ITC's thirty percent rate for solar facilities until the
end of 2016.54 Second, and perhaps more impactful, section 1603 of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), allowed
renewable energy project developers the option of taking a cash grant in
lieu of the ITC (Cash Grant Program). 5
According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory
(NREL), the Cash Grant Program served as the most important federal
incentive for solar power in 2010 and the first half of 2011, the last
period for which data is available.56 However, the Cash Grant Program
52. Id.; see also DSIRE, supra note 50 (noting that through Dec. 31, 2011, renewable
energy projects that qualify for the ITC are eligible for one-hundred percent depreciation
bonus in the first year).
53. See Erin Dewey, Sundown and You Better Take Care: Why Sunset Provisions
Harm the Renewable Energy Industry and Violate Tax Principles, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1105,
1114 (2011) (stating that tax credits allow "dollar-for-dollar reductions in income tax
liability," whereas tax deductions such as depreciation reduce taxable income and thus
lower tax liability).
54. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 §101, 26 U.S.C. §
48(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. IV 2010); Jack Cargas, U.S. Renewable Energy Tax Equity Inv.
and the Treasury Cash Grant Program 2 (U.S. P'ship for Renewable Energy Fin., White
Paper, Apr. 2010), available at http://uspref.org/white-papers.
55. See American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 § 1603, 26 U.S.C. § 48
note (Supp. IV 2010); Overview and Status of the §1603 Program, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY (Jan. 18, 2011. 1:43 PM), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Pages/
1603.aspx (scroll to bottom of the page; then click hyperlink entitled "STATUS
OVERVIEW").
56. See Michael Mendelsohn & Ryan Hubbell, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab.,
Presentation on NREL's Renewable Energy Financial Tracing Initiative IH 2011 Summary
48 (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://financere.nrel.gov/finance/webfm send/60/
Q410_REFTIPresentation_%2818 May_2011%29.pdf (showing that among survey
respondents constructing PV facilities over 1 MW in size, approximately sixty percent
viewed the Cash Grant Program as "extremely" important, and approximately twenty
percent viewed it as "very" important).
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expired on December 31, 2011, and given the legislative gridlock that
typically precedes an election, commentators do not expect an
extension of the program prior to the 2012 elections. 8 Not to worry, as
taxable corporate profits rebound, "tax equity investors"5 9 will likely
maintain the flow of equity investment to renewable energy projects.
B. Tax Equity Investors
Tax equity investors are passive owners of an asset or project
that provides not only a return based on the asset's cash flow but also
from federal tax deductions or credits. 60 The ITC, PTC and Cash Grant
Program led to more than $4 billion in tax equity commitments to
renewable energy projects in the first half of 2011, the most recent
period on which data is available.61 Federal tax equity benefits often
make up as much as sixty percent of a typical renewable energy project
cost, and thus are critical to the solar industry's continued progress.62
Until the expiration of solar power's thirty percent ITC in 2017,
profitable corporations will have a strong incentive to own or otherwise
contribute equity to solar generation facilities.
57. See Charles Green & David Hess, Congress, Bush Spar Before Election, Producing
Gridlock On Legislation, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 6, 1991, http://articles.philly.com/1991-
10-06/news/25816708_ jobless-benefits-bush-spar-extra-benefits ("pre-election jockeying
is a prescription for legislative gridlock over the next year and will reduce the already slim
odds for action on such national problems"); Adam Clymer, Congressional Memo; As
Campaign Heats Up, Senate Just Stops Cold, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996,
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/13/us/congressional-memo-as-campaign-heats-up-senate-
just-stops-cold.html?scp=1&sq=%22senate%2C+embroiled%22&stanyt ("The Senate,
embroiled in a presidential campaign as never before, may be surpassing itself in
ineffectiveness.").
58. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, U.S. POLICY OUTLOOK FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY
2-5 (2011), available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/54cO249b-9d5c-
4cO3-8d35-28alala33a84/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/77e5cbd2-e0be-45de-a448-
2c4e4d21153a/pfnJunel l.pdf (discussing the consensus opinion by Rob Gramlich, senior
vice president of public policy for the American Wind Energy Association, Greg Wetstone,
vice president for governmental affairs for Terra-Gen Power, and Jon Chase, vice president
of government relations at Vestas Americas that the cash grant program is unlikely to be
renewed prior to 2012 elections).
59. See infra Part III.B.
60. Cargas, supra note 54, at 2.
61. Prospective 2011-2012 Tax Equity Market Observations, U.S. P'SHIP FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN., 2, (July 2011), http://uspref.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/US-
PREF-Tax-Equity-Market-Observations-v2.2.pdf
62. Arnold E. Grant, Reed Smith LLP, Presentation on Structuring Solar Projects to
Maximize Tax Subsidies (Mar. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.reedsmith.com/_db/ documents/ReedSmithTax_Presentation.pdf.
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Tax equity investors are already returning to large-scale
renewable projects en masse. In 2008, approximately twenty tax equity
investors financed renewable energy projects; in 2009, as revenues slid
and taxable profit disappeared, only four to six investors remained
63active. As of July 2011, there were at least fifteen active tax equity
investors in renewable energy,64 including Google Inc.,65 Citigroup
Inc.,66 US Bancorp,67 and PG&E Corp.68  As experienced tax equity
investors return to the renewable energy market, syndicators are also
introducing new private equity investors to tax equity opportunities in
renewable energy. 69 Thus, solar projects should have the tools to attract
equity, at least through the expiration of the ITC in 2016. Whether they
can attract debt is the real key to the utility-scale solar industry going
forward.
IV. SOLAR PROJECT FINANCE AND THE MISSING LENDING LINK
Despite the solar power industry's recent growth, "balance sheet
financing" is possible for few of the utility-scale solar projects that
63. See PAUL SCHWABE ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ENERGY
PROJECT FINANCING: IMPACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION, at v
(2010), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/44930.pdf.
64. Cargas, supra note 54, at 2.
65. Joel Kirkland, Cash Rich Companies Begin to Make Renewable Energy
Investments, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/08/18/18climatewire-cash-rich-companies-begin-to-
make-renewable-e-3023.html (citing Google's $170 million investment in utility-scale
Ivanpah solar project in 2011 as evidence of a preferential tax equity market).
66. Press Release, Sungevity, Sungevity and Citi Create New Fund for Residential
Solar Projects (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.sungevity.com/sungevity-and-citi-create-new-
fund-residential-solar-projects (announcing Citi's creation of a renewable energy tax equity
fund to support over $50 million in new residential solar projects developed by Sungevity).
67. Press Release, SolarCity, U.S. Bancorp and SolarCity Announce New $158 Million
Fund to Finance Solar Projects (June 1, 2011),
http://www.solarcity.com/pressreleases/90/U-S-Bancorp-and-SolarCity-Announce-New-
$158-Million-Fund-to-Finance-Solar-Projects.aspx.
68. The northern California utility holding company PG&E created the $100 million
Pacific Energy Capital II fund to finance residential solar installations with SunRun. This
follows PG&E's Pacific Energy Capital I, a $60 million tax equity fund created for
investment with SolarCity in January 2010. See Todd Woody, A $100 Million Pool for
Solar Financing, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (June 21, 2010, 7:20 AM),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/a-100-million-pool-for-solar-financing/.
69. Elisa Wood, Post-stimulus Financing: Will Renewable Growth Continue?,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/08/post-stimulus-financing-
will-renewable-growth-continue.
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often require hundreds of millions of dollars in capital investment.70
Usually, poorly-capitalized project developers71 and risk-averse utilities
cannot develop renewable energy generation projects alone.72
Therefore, utility-scale solar projects depend on "project finance"
structures to fund development, making lenders an integral part of the
process. 73 Two particular structures, the "flip" partnership and the sale-
leaseback, allow developers, as opposed to an investor-owned utility or
other power purchaser, to shoulder the risk through the early stages of
the project.74 Equally as important, project finance structures also allow
the passive equity investor to capture the appropriate federal tax credit
and accelerated depreciation.7 5
A. Solar Project Finance Structures
The "flip" partnership requires the equity investor and the
project developer to form a partnership, or limited liability company
taxed as a partnership, that will develop, own and operate the renewable
70. See MARK BOLINGER, FINANCING NON-RESIDENTIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC PROJECTS:
OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB. ii (2009), available at
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ealems/reports/Ibnl-1410e.pdf (noting that projects hoping to proceed
using balance sheet finance will face many barriers, including "high up-front costs, a steep
learning curve for a non-core business function, technology and performance risk, and a
potential inability to make efficient use of the project's [tax benefits)").
71. See Ucilia Wang, The Numbers Game, PV MAGAZINE, June 2010, at 32, available
at http://www.pv-magazine.com/archive/articles/beitrag/the-numbers-game-
100000962/86/?tx-ttnews[backCat]=128&cHash=0ldOf9bl63de7c60e305afclac34bc90
(explaining that many "poorly capitalized developers" underestimate the "hefty investment"
required during the early stages of solar power project development).
72. Katie Fehrenbacher, Smart Grid 101: Utilities Are Very Risk Averse, GIGAOM (Jan.
24, 2010, 6:26 PM), http://gigaom.com/cleantech/smart-grid-101-utilities-are-very-risk-
averse/.
73. "Project finance" is one way to fund a project that depends not on the
creditworthiness of the borrowers or value of the underlying asset, but on the project's
ability to repay the debt through cash flows at a rate consistent with the project's risk. A
project finance deal is defined by five key components: (1) the debtor is a special-purpose
vehicle (SPV), typically created by sponsor equity and mezzanine debt, which is financially
and legally independent of the sponsors; (2) lenders have only limited recourse to the
sponsors; (3) project risks are allocated equitably among all parties in the transaction; (4)
cash flows generated by the SPV are sufficient to cover operating costs and service the debt
in terms of both capital repayment and interest; (5) collateral is given by sponsors as
security for receipts and assets used to manage the project. STEFANO GATTI, PROJECT
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (2008).
74. Investment in Alternative Energy, supra note 46, at 1.
75. See infra Part IV.A.
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energy facility. 6 Typically, the partnership then allocates 99% of its
taxable income (or loss) and 99% of the associated tax credits, to the
equity investor, with the remaining income/loss and credits allocated to
the developer.77 Upon completion of the project, cash distributions
from operations are usually split, with 99% accruing to the equity
investor and 1% to the developer.78  After the equity investor has
received its targeted return, the "flip" in allocation typically occurs such
that approximately 95% of distributions accrue to the developer and 5%
to the investor.79 Following the flip, which typically occurs
concurrently with the expiration of the tax credits, the developer often
has an option to purchase the investor's interest in the project for fair
market value.80
Unlike the "flip," the sale-leaseback structure allows a solar
project to proceed in the absence of developer capital, with one-hundred
percent financing of the equity contributed by passive equity investors.
The sale-leaseback project structure requires that the equity investor
purchase the energy generation facility no more than ninety days after it
was originally placed in service.8 1  Typically, the investor uses a
combination of equity and non-recourse debt to finance the purchase,
with the equity component required to comprise at least twenty percent
of the capitalized cost of the facility for the IRS to recognize the tax
benefit.82 The investor then leases the facility back to the developer to
operate and maintain for a term that may not exceed eighty percent of
the facility's useful life, generally as determined by an independent
76. Investment in Alternative Energy, supra note 46, at 1.
77. Id. at 2 (noting that Revenue Procedure 2007-45 IRB 967 provides a safe harbor for
a "flip" partnership and requires, among other things, that the developer has a minimum one
percent interest in the partnership's income/loss, deduction and tax credits at all times
during the partnership's existence, the equity investor has exposure to material income and
gain items equal to at least five percent of equity investment, minimum equity percentages
by equity partner, etc.).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. The taxpayer may claim an inflation-adjusted tax credit per kilowatt hour
of electricity produced for a "10-year period beginning on the date the facility was originally
placed in service. . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 45(a)-(b) (2006).
81. Investment in Alternative Energy, supra note 46, at 3 (explaining that safe harbor
requirements include: equity investor makes and maintains at least twenty percent equity
investment of capitalized cost of lease facility, term of lease does not exceed eighty percent
of economic life of leased facility, at end of lease term the expected value of facility is equal
to at least twenty percent of original capitalized cost).
82. Id.
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appraiser or engineer.8 In order for the equity investor in a sale-
leaseback arrangement to claim ownership, and the tax credits that
accrue to the owner, the arrangement must be a "true lease" for federal
income tax purposes.84 Investors may meet this standard by complying
with the safe harbor in IRS Revenue Procedure 2001-28.
B. Domestic Lending Shortfall
A small number of European banks have traditionally
dominated global renewable energy project lending.86  In particular,
German commercial banks lead the world in providing debt for
renewable energy project finance. Of the roughly $78 billion in solar
energy project financing that occurred in 2010, forty-five percent of it
occurred in Germany.
Despite increasing U.S. demand for solar projects, domestic
lenders remain "years behind their European counterparts."88 More
recently, U.S. banks have been "eyeing renewable energy projects," and
as one financier notes, "if the developer offers a financeable project, the
lender will be there." 89 According to these lenders, a "financeable"
project includes proven technology (such as PV, wind turbines, and
geothermal), contracts with established manufacturers and contractors,
and perhaps most importantly, a power purchase agreement (PPA) with
a reliable buyer.90 A PPA is a long-term contract, typically lasting for
ten or twenty years, to buy energy at a fixed price from a specific
source.91 The customer may be anyone, but it appears lenders prefer
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Rev. Proc. 2001-28, 2001-19 I.R.B. 1156 (stipulating that a lease for federal
income tax purposes must meet "[m]inimum unconditional 'at risk' investment" by the
lessor, contain certain lease term and renewal requirements, meet requirements for purchase
and sale rights, and meet a number of other guidelines); Investment in Alternative Energy,
supra note 46, at 4 (listing the "key" requirements of Revenue Procedure 2001-28).
86. PAUL SCHWABE ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ENERGY
PROJECT FINANCE: IMPACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION 6 (2010),
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/44930.pdf.
87. See Wood, supra note 69.
88. Matt Daily & Nichola Groom, U.S. Solar Growth Hinges on Big Cash Infusions,
REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2011, 4:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/03/us-solar-
financing-idUSTRE7227AW20110303.
89. Wood, supra note 69.
90. Id.
91. See Marc Gunther, For solar energy, the future looks bright, FORTUNE (Oct. 4,
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PPAs with institutional, low-risk buyers such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
or investor-owned utilities, both of which regularly contract to buy solar
power.92
Despite customer-demand typically fixed by contract for twenty
years, domestic banks are reticent to lend to solar projects because they
"just don't like to go long on debt."93 Furthermore, many commercial
banks do not have the appetite or experience to support utility-scale
solar projects.94 For example, even with a $1.6 billion federal loan
guarantee, BrightSource Energy, Inc.'s massive Ivanpah solar energy
facility relied on debt financing from the Federal Financing Bank, as
opposed to a private lender. 95  The lack of domestic lending poses a
significant obstacle for utility-scale solar facilities that, like other
infrastructure projects, require long-term financing over the entire
period covered by the PPA. The best way to convince domestic lenders
to "go long" on utility-scale solar project debt is for the federal
government to provide a safety net through the provision of loan
guarantees. From 2009 to 2011, during the administration of the federal
loan guarantee program, domestic bank lending increased as solar




93. See Daily & Groom, supra note 88; Matt Daily & Sara McBride, Analysis: U.S.
solar-sector growth hinges on financing quest, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2010, 6:05 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/17/us-solar-financing-analysis-
idUSTRE69GlM820101017 ("Bankers generally prefer smaller, less risky projects and
shorter-term loans than the 20-year terms solar plants typically need.").
94. Terrance Murray, Details on NRG Energy's $300M Ivanpah Investment, GREEN
ENERGY REPORTER (Oct. 27, 2010, 3:51 PM),
http://www.greenenergyreporter.com/renewables/solar/details-nrg-energys-300m-ivanpah-
investment/. The CEO of solar thermal system designer and developer BrightSource
explained that the DOE loan guarantee is critical since he "doubts" commercial banks have
the appetite to support billion dollar renewable energy projects following the 2008
downturn. Id.
95. Ucilia Wang, BrightSource Raises Another $26M IPO for 2011?, GIGAOM (Sept.
27, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://gigaom.com/cleantech/brightsource-raises-another-26m-ipo-for-
2011/.
96. See Daily & Groom, supra note 88 (offering the view of a senior executive at
Sharp Solar Energy Solutions Group that higher than expected returns have caused lenders
to grow "more comfortable with solar technology").
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V. THE "OLD" LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAMS
A. Section 1703 and Section 1705 Loan Guarantee Programs
In the EPAct, Congress defines a "loan guarantee" as "any
guarantee, insurance, or other pledge with respect to the payment of all
or a part of the principal or interest on any debt obligation of a non-
Federal borrower to a non-Federal lender. . . ."97 The EPAct empowers
the Secretary of Energy, after consulting with the Secretary of Treasury,
to make loan guarantees for qualified renewable energy projects and
with the appropriate terms and conditions.98 In the event a developer
defaults on its federally guaranteed debt, the holder of the loan
guarantee has the right to demand payment of the unpaid amount from
the Secretary of Energy. 99  From 2009 through 2011, the DOE
administered two different federal loan guarantee programs. While one
was permanent and the other temporary, both purported to support
domestic clean energy. 00
Congress established the permanent loan guarantee program
under section 1703 of the EPAct for projects that "avoided, reduced or
sequestered air pollutants" and employed "new or significantly
improved technologies as compared to commercial technologies." 0'
Projects that avoided air pollutants using "technology in general use in
the commercial marketplace," such as PV and wind turbines, were
therefore not eligible for the loan guarantees under Section 1703.102
The 1703 loan program remains in place today and since 2009 has
conditionally committed approximately $11 billion in guarantees across
four projects, including $8.3 billion for the construction and operation
97. 2 U.S.C. § 661a(3) (2006).
98. Requirements include: the loan guarantee "shall not exceed an amount equal to 80
percent of the project cost," there must be a "reasonable prospect of repayment of principle
and interest," the "obligation shall be shall be subject to condition that the obligation is not
subordinate to other financing," "interest at a rate that does not exceed a level that the
Secretary determines appropriate, taking into account the prevailing interest in the private
sector for similar loans and risks," and "full repayment over a period not to exceed the lesser
of-(1) 30 years; or (2) 90 percent of the projected useful life of physical asset to be
financed," among others. See 42 U.S.C. § 16512 (2006).
99. Id.
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16511-16 (Supp. IV 2010).
101. Id. § 16513.
102. See id.
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of two new reactors at Georgia Power Company's Vogtle nuclear power
plant.103
In 2009, Congress created the 1705 Program: a second,
temporary loan guarantee program "for [the] rapid deployment of
renewable energy and electric power transmission projects[.]"' 04
Section 406 of the ARRA amended Title XVII of the EPAct to include
the additional section 1705, which, unlike section 1703, provided for
guarantees to projects utilizing commercial technologies. 0 5
Additionally, Congress appropriated $4 billion to pay the costs of
implementing the 1705 Program.106
B. Past Successes of 1705 Program
The 1705 Program facilitated a leveraged approach to renewable
energy development that provided an estimated ten dollars in loan
guarantees for every dollar appropriated to the program. 107 Even with a
thirty-three percent funding cut, 08 the 1705 Program was extremely
successful; from September 2009 through September 2011, the DOE
dispersed roughly $12 billion in loan guarantees for solar power
generation projects. 109 Four of the five largest PV farms in the world
are under development in the United States at least in part thanks to the
1705 Program.110
103. See Our Projects, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE,
https://lpo.energy.gov/?pageid=45 (last visited Feb. 7, 2012), for a list of projects
receiving loan guarantees. But see Fred Sissane et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40414,
ENERGY PROVISIONS IN THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009 (P.L.
111-5) 11 n.33 (2009) (noting the sluggish rate at which loan guarantees were awarded
under the Section 1703 Program and specifically citing that in the first four years of the
program's existence "no guarantees had been awarded to any type of technology").
104. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 406, 42 U.S.C. § 16511-16
(Supp. IV 2010). Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 16511 et seq.,
was amended by adding 42 U.S.C. § 16516. Id.
105. Id.
106. House Jobs Bill Would Restore $2 Billion For Loan Guarantees, Makes Other
Changes, 93 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 1238 (Dec. 22, 2009) (explaining that of the $6
billion Congress allocated to the loan guarantee program, $2 billion was reallocated to pay
for the "Cash for Clunkers" program).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. BROwN, supra note 8, at 1.
110. See Largest Photovoltaic Solar Farms - Are they Advantageous over Distributed
Rooftop Solar and Why Utilities Love Them, GREEN WORLD INVESTOR (Mar. 5, 2011),
http://www.greenworldinvestor.com/2011/03/05/largest-photovoltaic-solar-farms-are-they-
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American lenders demonstrated the importance of the program
on its final day before expiration."' On September 30, 2011, the DOE
confirmed loan guarantees to three utility-scale solar generation
projects: First Solar's 550 Megawatts (MW) Desert Wind'1 2 and 230
MW Antelope Valley Solar Ranch One projects,' 3 and SunPower
Corp.'s 250 MW California Valley Solar Ranch project.1 4 Coincident
with the federal loan guarantees, Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, and the
Treasury-run Federal Financing Bank announced they would provide
debt financing to the Desert Wind and Antelope Valley projects,
respectively. 5  The dominoes continued to fall, as all three projects
sold that same day.1 6 Over $3 billion in financing went firm and more
than 1000 MW of future energy generation capacity changed hands in a
matter of hours as a direct result of the loan guarantees." 7
Outside the United States, loan guarantee programs have
successfully stimulated investment in strategically-important
infrastructure. For example, in 2008, France instituted C8 billion in
guarantees to support high-speed train development, which kept more
than £20 billion in projects on track." 8  Unfortunately, the 1705
advantageous-over-distributed-rooftop-solar-and-why-utilities-love-them/.
111. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
112. Press Release, First Solar, Inc., First Solar Sells 550-Megawatt Desert Sunlight
Solar Farm, Among World's Largest (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://investor.firstsolar.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=610018 [hereinafter Desert
Sunlight].
113. Press Release, First Solar, Inc. Exelon to Expand its Clean Energy Fleet with
Acquisition of 230-Megawatt Solar Photovoltaic Project from First Solar (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://investor.firstsolar.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=609723 [hereinafter Exelon].
114. News Release, SunPower Corp., NRG Energy Completes Acquisition of 250-
Megawatt California Valley Solar Ranch from SunPower (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nrg-energy-completes-acquisition-of-250-
megawatt-california-valley-solar-ranch-from-sunpower-130876833.html [hereinafter NRG].
115. See Desert Sunlight, supra note 112; Exelon, supra note 113.
116. See Desert Sunlight, supra note 112 (highlighting the sale of Desert Wind to
affiliates of NextEra Energy Resources, LLC and GE Energy Financial Services, with each
owning a fifty percent stake in the project); Exelon, supra note 113 (highlighting the sale of
Antelope Valley Solar Ranch One to Exelon); NRG, supra note t14.
117. See Desert Sunlight, supra note 112; Exelon, supra note 113; NRG, supra note
114.
118. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, Outlook for Private Investment in US
Infrastructure, PROJECT FIN. NEWSWIRE, at 24, 31 (Keith Martin ed., June 2011), available
at http://www.chadboume.com/files/Publication/54cG249b-9d5c-4cG3-8d35-
28alala33a84/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/77e5cbd2-e0be-45de-a448-
2c4e4d21153a/pfn Junel1.pdf (quoting comments of Fadi Selwan, chief operating officer
of VINCI Concessions / Development, an international developer of infrastructure).
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Program's successes have been overshadowed by its most notable
failure - the bankruptcy of loan guarantee recipient Solyndra LLC
(Solyndra).
C. The Solyndra Bankruptcy
On September 4, 2009, the DOE announced that it had finalized
a $535 million loan guarantee to Solyndra." 9 It was the first loan
guarantee under the 1705 Program. 120 Almost exactly two years later,
on September 1, 2011, Solyndra announced, "it was ceasing operations,
laying of [sic] 1,100 workers and preparing to file for bankruptcy
protection."121 Solyndra manufactured slightly more efficient PV
"tubes" (as opposed to panels), and when prices on traditional PV
panels dropped forty percent, Solyndra's technology was not
competitive.122  The immediate result of Solyndra's bankruptcy was
widespread criticism of the federal loan program as a whole; pundits
from across the political spectrum pointed to the loan guarantee
program as another example of ineffective stimulus of private
industry.123  During a September 14, 2011, Congressional hearing,
Republicans and Democrats came together to agree that the DOE's loan
guarantee to Solyndra was a bad decision.124
119. Solyndra Inc., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE,
https:/lpo.energy.gov/?projects=solyndra-inc (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
120. Neela Banerjee, Official Involved in Solyndra Loan Guarantee Resigns, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2011), http://articles.1atimes.com/201 1/oct/07/nation/la-na-obama-solyndra-
20111007.
121. Ronald D. White, Solar Panel Firm Solyndra to Cease Operations, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://articles.1atimes.com/201 1/sep/01/business/la-fi-solar-shutdown-
20110901.
122. See supra Section II.
123. See e.g., Anne C. Mulkern, Solyndra Bankruptcy Reveals Dark Clouds in Solar
Power Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/06/06greenwire-solyndra-bankruptcy-reveals-dark-
clouds-in-sol-45598.html?pagewanted=all; Gloria Gonzalez, Solyndra Backlash Risks
Hobbling US Clean Energy Sector, ENVTL. FIN. (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.environmental-
finance.com/news/view/2027.
124. See Memorandum from the Comm. on Energy and Commerce on The Solyndra
Story (Sept. 14, 2011), available at
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Medialfile/Hearings/Oversight/09141 1/Solyn
draStoryFinalMemo.pdf ("[D]OE and OMB did not take adequate steps to protect taxpayer
dollars. Emails and communications produced to the Committee show that DOE and OMB
staff repeatedly questioned whether the company had the financial resources to support the
operations of the loan guarantee project. . . ."); Solyndra Cancels IPO Plans, Instead Sells
Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 18, 2010, 7:34 AM)
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While politicians point to a loan guarantee program rife with
"cronyism" as the impetus behind Solyndra's failure,1 25 a more careful
analysis reveals two procedural errors that doomed the Solyndra
transaction. First, the Secretary of the DOE agreed to subordinate the
federal loan guarantee's first lien claim on Solyndra's assets to a
subsequent $75 million credit agreement from private investors. 126 In
doing so, the DOE violated its own rule that forbid the loan guarantee
obligation from being subordinated to other financing, though allowing
for pari-passul27 lending at the discretion of the Secretary.128 Second,
the DOE and Office of Management of Budget (OMB) appeared to
accelerate the review process, granting Solyndra preliminary loan
guarantee approvals while skipping the "mandatory evaluations of the
financial and engineering viability of the projects." 29
These now politically-charged procedural issues overshadowed
a deeper, though simpler, structural error in the 1705 Program, namely,
that the DOE was encouraged to guarantee loans to immature start-up
companies with the same frequency and terms as those offered to
energy generation facilities utilizing mature PV and other renewable
energy technologies. In effect, the funds unnaturally accelerated the
evolution of a start-up company.130  Furthermore, Congress failed to
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GDLJAGO.htm (discussing Solyndra's
2009 cancelled initial public offering).
125. See Solyndra Loan 'Crony Capitalism at Its Worst,' GOP Rep Says, Fox NEWS
(Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/18/solyndra-loan-crony-
capitalism-at-its-worst-republican-says/ (quoting Rep. Senator Paul Ryan) (referring to the
Solyndra loan guarantee as "crony capitalism at its worst").
126. See Eric Lipton & John M. Broder, In Rush to Assist a Solar Company, U.S.
Missed Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at Al; Jim Snyder, Solyndra's Refinancing Would
Have Given U.S. a 40% Stake, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2011, 6:39 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-03/solyndra-s-refinancing-would-have-given-u-
s-a-40-stake.html ("A deal between the Energy Department and Solyndra in February
[2011] put taxpayer debt behind $75 million in private investment in case of liquidation.").
127. Referring to an arrangement in which creditors share equally and according to their
fractional interest in recovering funds during bankruptcy proceedings. Pari-passu,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pari-passu.asp#axzzldiJlwmNC (last
visited Nov. 3, 2011).
128. See 74 Fed. Reg. 63544, 63545 (Dec. 4, 2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 609)
("First, it should be borne in mind that nowhere does section 1702 itself require that the
Secretary receive a first lien on all project assets as a condition of his ability to make a loan
guarantee. Instead the statute requires only that the Secretary's guaranteed obligation 'not be
subordinate to other financing."').
129. Lipton & Broder, supra note 126.
130. See Ronnie Greene & Matthew Mosk, 'Connected' Energy Firm Got Lowest
Interest Rate on Government Loan, ABC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2011),
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prescribe an effective method to mitigate the operational and
technological risks inherent in lending hundreds of millions of dollars to
immature businesses. Where a private lender would typically seek
either an equity stake in the start-up or an above market interest rate, the
federal government chose neither, apparently willing to subjugate
taxpayer welfare for job creation.
However, a loan guarantee program supporting America's
transition to renewable energy need not expose taxpayer funds to the
risks inherent in "picking winners and losers" by guaranteeing loans to
unproven technology manufacturers like Solyndra.13 1
VI. THE PATH FORWARD: A NEW LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM
In total, the Loan Program Office (LPO) awarded approximately
$17 billion in loan guarantees under the 1705 Program, eighty-two
percent of which went to support two types of solar projects:
manufacturing facilities and power generation facilities. 132 Both project
types clearly serve the solar power industry; however, a program that
provides loan guarantees to emerging technology manufacturing
businesses like Solyndra and commercially-proven generation projects
under the same system runs counter to private sector lending
conventions and obfuscates the programs' stated mission to cost-
effectively support the construction of renewable, clean energy. 33 With
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/solyndra-lowest-interest-rate/story?id=14460246 (explaining
that the loans to Solyndra came with "advantegous terms in spite of red flags" such as a B+
grade from one rating agency and a "fair" grade from Dun & Bradstreet); Jeff St. John,
China's Solar Loans Still Mostly Untapped, GREENTECHSOLAR (Nov. 17, 2011),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/chinas-solar-loans-still-mostly-untapped/
(presenting evidence that China's loans to solar manufacturers are reported to be changing
interest in the 4-5% range, much higher than loans to Solyndra).
131. See Jim Snyder, Republicans Use Solyndra to Bash Obama's Plan, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-15/republicans-use-solyndra-to-
bash-obama-s-plan.html (quoting Rep. Mike Pompeo) ("This is exactly what we get when
the federal government tries to put money into businesses and tries to pick winners and
losers. . . .").
132. See BROWN,supra note 8, at 1.
133. Our Mission, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE,
https://lpo.energy.gov/?pageid=17 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) ("The mission of [the Loan
Programs Office] is to accelerate the domestic commercial deployment of innovative and
advanced clean energy technologies at a scale sufficient to contribute meaningfully to the
achievement of our national clean energy objectives-including job creation; reducing
dependency on foreign oil; improving our environmental legacy; and enhancing American
competitiveness in the global economy of the 21st century.").
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only minor amendments to the now expired 1705 Program, a new loan
guarantee program restricted to solar energy generation facilities will
not only promote lending to utility-scale solar projects, but also (A)
eliminate much of the previous program's risk exposure, (B) create
jobs, and (C) stimulate technological progress.
A. Reduced Risk
According to the Congressional Research Service, "solar
manufacturing projects are generally considered higher risk than solar
generation projects because the latter can use contractual mechanisms to
reduce market, project, and financial risks."1 34  Energy generation
projects typically allow for more flexibility on the part of the developer
to protect taxpayer investment, since the goal is not deployment or
manufacture of a specific technology but rather the cost-effective
construction of renewable energy. In 2010 and 2011, solar developers
switched nine projects, amounting to more than 4,500 MW in
generating capacity, from solar thermal technology to cheaper PV.135 In
August 2011, Solar Trust of America announced that the Blythe Solar
Power Project was switching from CSP to PV technology for its first
phase of construction, which required the project to forfeit $2.1 billion
loan guarantees.1 36 Thus, a new loan guarantee program restricted to
solar power generation projects takes advantage of the project
developers' and Congress' shared interest to construct cost-effective
solar power with the most efficient technology.
A generation-focused guarantee program will also keep the
federal government out of the business of making bets on specific
technologies.137 In the final tally, DOE's losses on Solyndra will pale in
comparison to those of private investors; venture capital (VC) firms
invested more than $1 billion in the company, making Solyndra
possibly "the largest VC loss ever."1 38 However, in contrast to the DOE
134. See BROWN, supra note 8, at 6.
135. Sills, Solar Panels, supra note 20, at 65.
136. Kanellos, supra note 25.
137. Lipton & Broder, supra note 127 (quoting Damien Lavera, a DOE spokesman)
("We did the analysis on our own and decided [the Solyndra loan guarantee] was a good
bet.").
138. See Jennifer Kho, What the Solyndra Bankruptcy Means for Clean Tech Investors,
FORBES (Sept. 23, 2011, 10:08 PM),
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Loan Programs Office, VC investors owned an equity interest that
would have permitted them to share in Solyndra's profit had the
company been successful. Commentators express a legitimate concern
that loan guarantees subject taxpayers to only the most risky loans that
private industry is unwilling to underwrite.' 39 In addition, legislators
correctly attacked the provision of loan guarantees to unproven
technology companies, questioning whether the government is qualified
to act as a venture capitalist.140  A new loan guarantee program
restricted to proven renewable generation projects addresses these
concerns by limiting the government's role in the choice of technology
decision, and incentivizing the developer to construct the facility using
the most cost-effective manner possible.
B. Job Creation
The 2008 financial downturn, and President Obama's need to
jumpstart the economy, led the executive branch to rebrand its support
for renewable energy as a job creation mechanism.141 For example, in
September 2011, the Export-Import Bank of the United States
guaranteed $455 million in commercial loans to two solar projects in
Ontario, Canada, under the theory that the projects will create an
estimated 550 jobs in First Solar Inc.'s Ohio manufacturing facility.142
The executive branch need not look to manufacturing alone for job
creation.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferkho/2011/09/23/solyndra-bankruptcy-impact-cleantech-
investing/; Katie Fehrenbacher, Solyndra Could be the Biggest VC Loss in History, GIGAOM
(Sept. 1, 2011, 10:26 AM), http://gigaom.com/cleantech/solyndra-could-be-the-biggest-vc-
loss-in-history/.
139. Lisa Margonelli, How the U.S. Can Be Effective - Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 28, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/20/why-isnt-
the-us-a-leader-in-green-technology/how-government-can-stimulate-green-technology
(arguing that when it the government lends to fledgling businesses, it runs the risk of
supporting overly risky projects, and thus should stick to its "supporting basic research" and
fostering an environment in which private investors, not taxpayers, provide capital to grow
companies).
140. Snyder, supra note 131.
141. See Barack Obama's Plan to Create 5 Million New Green Jobs,
BARACKOBAMA.COM (2008), http://obama.3cdn.net/eff0ffldaa8bafe984_4yjqmv8j3.pdf.
142. Press Release, First Solar, Inc., Ex-Im Bank Announces Over $455 Million in
Project Financing for First Solar's Exports to Canada (Sept. 2, 2011),
http://investor.firstsolar.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=603219.
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A new loan guarantee program for renewable energy generation
projects will directly address both Congress' desire to create jobs and
the stated purpose of the previous 1705 Program to "encourage
commercial use in the United States of new or significantly improved
energy-related technologies and to achieve substantial environmental
benefits." 43 The Alliance for American Manufacturing, in conjunction
with the Political Economy Research Institute, released a 2009 study,
aptly titled How Infrastructure Investments Supports the U.S. Economy:
Employment, Productivity and Growth. The authors' research
demonstrates that a $1 billion infrastructure investment creates twenty-
two percent more jobs than an equal increase in consumer spending
generated by tax cuts. 14 4 Thus, not only will a loan guarantee program
have the obvious effect of promoting lending, it will encourage
domestic job growth.145
C. Technological Progress
A new loan guarantee program facilitates technological
innovation by creating demand for more efficient, cost-effective solar
panels irrespective of the technology. The market, not Congress or the
DOE, picks winners. For example, the $90.6 million loan guarantee
under the 1705 Program to Cogentrix of Alamosa, LLC will support the
construction of "one of the first utility-scale, high concentration
photovoltaic [(HCPV)] energy generation facilities in the nation and,
when completed, the largest of its kind in the world."1 4 6 Whereas a
manufacturer of HCPV technology would face a multitude of hard-to-
mitigate market and operational risks, a single energy generation facility
like Congentrix's may use contractual mechanisms to mitigate some of
143. U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY LOAN GUARANTEE TO COGENTRIX OF ALAMOSA, LLC FOR CONSTR. OF THE
COGENTRIX SOLAR PROJECT NEAR ALAMOSA, COLO. i (Apr. 2011), available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EA- 1 839-FEA-2011 .pdf.
144. James Helntz et al., How Infrastructure Investments Supports the U.S. Economy:
Employment, Productivity and Growth, POLITICAL EcoN. RESEARCH INST. & ALLIANCE FOR
AM. MFG. 3 (2009), http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/files/peri_aam finaljan 16
new.pdf.
145. See id.
146. Press Release, Cogentrix Energy LLC, Department of Energy Finalizes $90.6
Million Loan Guarantee to Cogentrix of Alamosa, LLC to Support Colorado Solar Project
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.cogentrix.com/news.aspx?id=13.
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those same risks.147 With a new loan guarantee program focused on
generating renewable energy as opposed to supporting a specific
technology, the LPO refrains from breathing life into inefficient,
noncompetitive solar power generating technologies.
Case in point is Stirling Energy Systems (SES), an Arizona-
based manufacturer of solar power technology that was unable to obtain
a federal loan guarantee for either its projects or manufacturing facilities
and entered bankruptcy in September 2011.148 SES's unique
technology,149 like Solyndra's, became prohibitively expensive 5 0 as PV
prices dropped in 2010 and 2011, and SES faced the same struggles as
Solyndra to find third party financing.' Projects originally specifying
SES technology shifted to the more cost-efficient PV technology,
actually decreasing the cost of those projects. 152  Loan guarantees
restricted to energy generation, as opposed to technology manufacture,
allow the developer flexibility to evaluate market prices and trends to
choose whichever generating technology will most efficiently serve the
project's needs. Again, Congress' goal of generating cheap, reliable
renewable energy is thereby aligned with that of the developer, who
stands to profit from the most cost efficient choice.
147. See BROWN, supra note 8, at 6.
148. Jennifer Runyon, Solar Shakeout Continues: Stirling Energy Systems Files for
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Sept. 28, 2011),
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/09/solar-shakeout-continues-
stirling-energy-systems-files-for-chapter-7-bankruptcy.
149. Ucilia Wang, Stirling Redesigns Suncatcher, Plans 1.5 MW Demo Project,
GREENTECHSOLAR (June 23, 2009), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/stirling-
energy-systems-redesigns-suncatcher-plans-for-1.5mw-demo-project/ (explaining that the
SES technology uses a large parabolic dish of mirrors (40 feet across) to concentrate the sun
onto a receiver housing hydrogen gas filled tubes, and the heated gas runs a four-cylinder
Stirling engine that drives a generator to produce electricity).
150. Solar One Calico Project, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
http://www.blm.gov/ca/st/en/fo/barstow/solar one-calico.html (last updated Sept. 8, 2011)
(noting that Calico Solar, LLC originally planned to build a 663 MW solar project with
SES's SunCatcher technology, but subsequently switched approximately 500 megawatts of
the project to PV panels as prices declined).
151. See Sara Mitchell, Former Calico Manufacturer Declares Bankruptcy, DESERT
DISPATCH (Oct. 2, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.desertdispatch.com/news/solar-11679-
project-energy.html (noting that SES did not receive funding from the federal govermment,
and the company's bankruptcy was a direct result of its failure to find third-party investors).
152. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The expiration of the 1705 Program last September removed a
key incentive for banks to lend to solar and other renewable energy
projects.' 53  Major strides in solar power technology' 54 and project
finance structures15 5 have positioned the solar industry for future
success, yet lenders remain hesitant to finance utility-scale solar
projects. It is this author's belief that domestic lenders will eventually
follow the lead of European banks and reduce the cost of renewable
energy project debt. In the meantime, a federal loan guarantee program
focused on energy generation projects utilizing commercially-proven
technology will not only incentivize project lending so as to maintain
the solar industry's progress, it will also create jobs without exposing
taxpayer dollars to the risks associated with lending to emerging
technology manufacturers.' 56  Of course, we can also adhere to strict
free market principles when it comes to renewable energy;15 7 but that
choice comes with risks as well. Fortune Magazine's Brian Dumaine
warns, "If the subsidies are killed, America is choosing not to grow a
new industry and create jobs. If we don't want them, China, India and
Japan are happy to take them."'
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153. See supra Part V.A-B.
154. See supra Part II.
155. See supra Part IV.A.
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157. See generally ANDREw P. MORRISS ET AL., THE FALSE PROMISE OF GREEN ENERGY
(2011) (expounding on the ill-effects green energy programs).
158. Brian Dumaine, Washington's Job-Killing Act, FORTUNE, Sept. 5, 2011, at 14.
2012] 373

